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NOTES
CAN WE EXPRESS OURSELVES DANCING
NAKED?-BARNES V. GLEN THEATRE,
INC. -THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Chris Joe
ITIGATION challenging the constitutionality' of Indiana's public
indecency statute2 began in 1985 with the filing of three separate
lawsuits in the Northern District Court of Indiana. Wishing to pro-
vide nude dancing at adult entertainment establishments, the plaintiffs3
sought to enjoin the enforcement of the statute, which for all practical pur-
poses required the dancers to wear pasties and G-strings while dancing.
Cognizant of the fact that the defendant law enforcement officers had ar-
rested and prosecuted nude dancers under the nudity statute in the past and
1. The Constitutional provision involved was the First Amendment: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom os speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I (em-
phasis added).
2. IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988). The statute proscribes public nudity across the board
stating in pertinent part:
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
(1) Engages in sexual intercourse;
(2) Engages in deviate sexual conduct;
(3) Appears in a state or nudity; or
(4) Fondles the genitals of himself or another person;
Commits public indecency, a class a misdemeanor.
(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic
area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the
female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or
the showing of covered male genitals in a discernably turgid state.
Id.
3. In the initial Glen Theatre litigation, Glen Theatre, Inc., Gayle Ann Marie Sutro, and
Carla Johnson sued the City of South Bend, the city police chief, the country prosecutor
(Michael Barnes), and the state attorney general. In the initial Kitty Kat litigation and the
initial Diamond litigation, Darlene Miller and JR's Kitty Kat Lounge, Inc. (the Kitty Kat
plaintiffs) and Sandy Diamond, Lynn Jacobs, 720 Corporation, and 726 Corporation (the Dia-
mond plaintiffs) independently sued the same state defendants as well as the Indiana Alcoholic
Beverage Commission. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414, 415
(N.D. Ind. 1988), rev'd, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, Ill S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
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concerned that they intended to continue doing so in the future,4 the plain-
tiffs asserted that Indiana's use of the law to prevent nude dancing in their
adult entertainment businesses would infringe on their First Amendment
right of freedom of expression.
Plaintiff Glen Theatre's primary business was operating an adult book-
store which sold written and printed publications and displayed movies and
live entertainment. Sitting in a private booth, consenting adults could insert
coins into a timing mechanism to view nude and semi-nude women dancing
behind glass panels. The bookstore did not sell alcoholic beverages. 5
As a result of eleven arrests for violations of the Indiana nudity statute
between March 1983 and March 1985, the bookstore temporarily discontin-
ued showing the nude performances. Glen Theatre then decided to schedule
plaintiff Gayle Ann Marie Sutro-a dancer, model, professional actor, and a
member of the Screen Actors Guild-to perform nude dancing routines dur-
ing the summer and fall of 1985 to coincide with the showing of one of her
pornographic movies in the area. Sutro stated in an affidavit that she in-
tended to communicate and to entertain in her choreographed nude dance. 6
Plaintiff Kitty Kat was a nightclub that sold alcoholic beverages and
showed "go-go" dancing. Until the police threatened to arrest its dancers,
the club had them dance nude as live entertainment for its customers. The
owner of the Kitty Kat complied with the demands of the police depart-
ment. Nonetheless, he still sought a means to entertain his patrons with
nude dancing. 7
The dancers at Kitty Kat were paid entirely by a commission determined
by the number of drinks sold during their performances. Plaintiff Darlene
Miller, a waitress and dancer at Kitty Kat, depicted her nude dances as "just
entertaining, just dancing" and admitted that her purpose for dancing was to
get the customers to like her, so they would buy more drinks. Miller wanted
to dance nude under the assumption that if she did so, she would earn more
money.8
The parties to the first litigation (hereinafter referred to as the "Glen The-
atre" litigation) were Glen Theatre and Sutro and the defendant state law
enforcement officials. The district judge granted the plaintiffs' request for a
preliminary injunction. This injunction prevented the enforcement of the
public indecency statute against the bookstore, based on a finding that the
4. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, 726 F. Supp. 728, 729-30 (N.D. Ind.
1985). Indiana had arrested eleven nude dancers at Glen Theatre's bookstore for violating the
nudity law prior to the beginning of litigation in 1985. Using the public indecency act, Indiana
had also successfully prosecuted people for activities unrelated to communication of ideas; In
re Levinson, 444 N.E.2d 1175, 1176 (Ind. 1983); Preston v. State, 287 N.E.2d 347, 348 (Ind.
1972); Thomas v. State, 154 N.E.2d 503, 504-05 (Ind. 1958); Blanton v. State, 533 N.E.2d 190,
191 (Ind. App. 1989); Sweeney v. State, 586 N.E.2d 651, 652 (Ind. App. 1985); Thompson v.
State, 482 N.E.2d 1372, 1373-74 (Ind. App. 1985); Adims v. State, 461 N.E.2d 750, 741-42
(Ind. App. 1984); State v. Elliott, 435 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Ind. App. 1982); Lasko v. State, 409
N.E.2d 1124, 1126 (Ind. App. 1980).
5. Glen Theatre, 695 F. Supp. at 419-20, app. A.
6. Id.




law was facially overbroad. 9
Subsequently, the Glen Theatre case was followed by the second related
litigation. The parties to the second case (hereinafter referred to as the "Dia-
mond" litigation) consisted of another plaintiff adult nightclub and essen-
tially the same defendants. Finding that the Twenty-first Amendment
allowed states to ban nude dancing in bars that sold alcoholic beverages,
however, the district judge in Diamond denied plaintiffs motions for prelimi-
nary injunctions.' 0
The defendants appealed the Glen Theatre preliminary injunction. The
Seventh Circuit found that the statute was not overbroadII and reversed the
district court's grant of the preliminary injunction. 12 On remand, the Glen
Theatre and Diamond cases were consolidated. Acting under instructions
from the Seventh Circuit, the district judge decided that the nude dancing
involved was not expressive activity protected by the First Amendment and
denied the plaintiffs' requests for injunctive relief.13 The judge found that
"[tihese strip tease dances [were] not performed in any theatrical or dra-
matic context" and that they fell "squarely within the prohibitions of Indi-
ana's Public Indecency statute, which [had] been found constitutional."' 4
This time the plaintiffs appealed. A panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding as a matter of law that non-obscene nude dancing was expressive
entertainment entitled to some protection under the Constitution, despite
having only limited artistic value.15
The circuit court then granted the state defendants' request for rehearing
en banc and vacated the panel decision. The court again reversed and en-
9. Glen Theatre, 726 F. Supp. at 723-33.
10. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, No. S 85-598 (N.D. Ind. May 5, 1986) (Memoran-
dum and Order of Miller, J.); Diamond v. Civil City of South Bend, No. S 85-722 (N.D. Ind.
May 5, 1986) (Memorandum and Order of Miller, J.).
11. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Pearson, 802 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1986). The circuit court found
that the statute was not overboard because of an Indiana Supreme Court decision that ap-
peared to construe the law more narrowly than it appeared on its face. Id.
The Indiana Supreme Court appeared to narrow the breadth of the public indecency statute
by limiting its prohibition to only conduct "traditionally ... held to be public indecency....
[The statute] may be constitutionally required to tolerate or to allow some nudity as a part of
some larger form of expression meriting protection, when the communication of ideas is in-
volved." State v. Bayslinger, 397 N.E.2d 580, 587 (Ind. 1979), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Clark v. Indiana, 446 U.S. 931 (1979), and appeal dismissed sub nom. Dove v. Indiana, 449
U.S. (1980). Construed in this manner by the Indiana Supreme Court, the statute could not be
unconstitutional for facial overbreadth. The United States Supreme Court subsequently dis-
missed Bayslinger's appeals for want of a substantial federal question. It is important to note,
however, that the Indiana Supreme Court never affirmatively restricted the scope of the stat-
ute. Rather, it stated only that the statute may require a limiting construction in certain cases
when it appears to conflict with First Amendment guarantees. Bayslinger, 397 N.E.2d at 587.
12. Glen Theatre, 802 F.2d at 287.
13. Glen Theatre, 695 F. Supp. at 419.
14. Id.
15. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 887 F.2d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 1989). Nevertheless,
the court went on to say that the state was not without authority to regulate the presentation
of nude dancing. The state could "impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions...
regulate the nonexpressive conduct for reasons unrelated to the suppression of speech," regu-




joined Indiana from enforcing its public indecency statute against the plain-
tiffs, holding that, as a matter of law, non-obscene nude dancing performed
as entertainment was expression and as such was entitled to limited protec-
tion under the First Amendment. 16 The court stated that "[w]hile clearly
not all conduct is expression, dance as entertainment is a form of conduct
that is inherently expressive."1 7 The court decided that the plaintiffs' nude
dancing conveyed the message of "eroticism and sensuality,"1 8 even though
it determined that nude dancing was artistically and aesthetically inferior in
quality when compared with other types of dancing, such as classical bal-
let.19 The court concluded that the public indecency statute was unconstitu-
tional since it proscribed the plaintiffs' ability to convey their messages of
eroticism. 20
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine (1) whether nude bar-
room dancing or "go-go" dancing was "speech" entitled to First Amend-
ment protection, and (2) if nude barroom dancing in fact was protectable
speech, whether Indiana's public indecency statute was unconstitutional
with respect to such dancing. In a five to four plurality decision, the Court
ruled that the public indecency law requiring the dancers to wear pasties and
G-strings did not violate the First Amendment. 2 1
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
opined that the nude dancing sought to be performed at these adult en-
tertainment establishments was entitled only to minimal First Amendment
protection and that any First Amendment interests were outweighed by the
state's interest in protecting societal order and morality. 22
Justice Scalia concurred with the judgment but found that there were no
First Amendment issues at all. Scalia found it important that nothing in the
language of the statute suggested any state purpose to directly suppress
expression. 23
Justice Souter concurred with the judgment and agreed that the nude
dancing was entitled to some First Amendment protection. Souter disagreed
with Rehnquist's emphasis on protecting public morality; instead, he be-
lieved that the law was valid because of the state's interest in preventing
crime and other pernicious secondary effects allegedly associated with nude
barroom dancing. 24
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dis-
sented. White argued that Indiana had no compelling state interests sup-
porting the law, since the explicit purpose of applying the statute against
nude dancing was to suppress directly the inherent expressive content of
16. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d at 1085.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1086-87.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
22. Id. at 2460-63 (Rehniquist, C.J.).
23. Id. at 2463-68 (Scalia, J., concurring).




I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
A. Symbolic Speech or Expressive Conduct
The Supreme Court has long held that certain kinds of nonverbal conduct
could be considered "symbolic speech" or "expressive conduct" entitled to
First Amendment protection. In fact, Justice Jackson once wrote that "sym-
bolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas ... a short
cut from mind to mind."' 26 Some commentators have suggested that there is
little distinction between speech and conduct within the meaning of the Con-
stitution in terms of their comparative abilities to communicate messages
and ideas.27 Nevertheless, the Court has recognized that there are differ-
ences, 28 and not all conduct constitutes constitutionally protected speech.29
When a law restricts oral or written speech, it must pass the strictest First
Amendment scrutiny even if its purpose is unrelated to suppression of com-
munication. 30 As a minimum, however, conduct is classified as constitution-
ally protected expression only if the actor intended to communicate or
convey a message by his conduct. 3 1
Consequently, as long as the actor intended to communicate a message or
express an idea or feeling, his conduct falls within the protective scope of the
First Amendment right of freedom of expression. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has invalidated many regulations whose direct purpose was the prohi-
bition of certain activities precisely because of their communicative compo-
25. Id. at 2471-76 (White, J., dissenting).
26. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).
27. Eg., Louis Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 79-80 (1968)
("A constitutional distinction between speech and conduct is specious. Speech is conduct, and
actions speak. There is nothing intrinsically sacred about wagging the tongue or wielding a
pen; there is nothing intrinsically more sacred about words than other symbols.").
28. Id. ("The] meaningful constitutional distinction is not between speech and conduct,
but between conduct that speaks, communicates, and other kinds of conduct.").
29. Id. It is arguable that all conduct could be construed as speech. "[A]ll behavior is
capable of being understood as communication." FRANKLIN SAUL HAIMAN, SPEECH AND
LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 31 (1981). However, such a broad definition of expressive conduct
would result in the unreasonable conclusion that all conduct would be protected by the First
Amendment. This is simply not the case. See infra text accompanying notes 31-48 for further
explanation.
30. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948) (reduce noise); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (to regulate election campaigns); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (to
prevent littering).
31. See Mellville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amend-
ment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 29, 36 (1973).
Whatever else may or may not be true of speech, as irreducible minimum it must
constitute a communication. That, in turn, implies both a communicator and a
communicatee-a speaker and an audience. [Without] an actual or potential
audience there can be no first amendment speech right. Nor may the first
amendment be invoked if there is an audience but no actual or potential
"speaker." [Unless] there is a human communicator intending to convey a
meaning by his conduct, it would be odd to think of it as conduct constituting a
communication protected by the first amendment.
1992]
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nents.3 2 When suppression of expression was not the primary purpose of the
law regulating conduct, but was only an incidental effect of proscribing the
activity for other important purposes, the Supreme Court has instead sus-
tained those laws.33 The Supreme Court described the situation clearly in
Texas v. Johnson:34
The government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive con-
duct than it has in restricting the written word or spoken word. It may
not, however, proscribe particular conduct because it has expressive ele-
ments. What might be termed the more generalized guarantee of free-
dom of expression makes the communicative nature of conduct an
inadequate basis for singling out that conduct for proscription. 35
B. Nude Dancing as Expressive Conduct
The Supreme Court has found that nude dancing could be expressive ac-
tivity and, consequently, protected by the First Amendment. 36 In Doran v.
Salem Inn, Inc. 37 the Court stated that "although the customary 'barroom'
type of nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected
expression . . . this form of entertainment might be entitled to First and
Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances. '38
It is important to emphasize, however, that the Court has indicated that
not all types of dancing are entitled to First Amendment protection as ex-
pressive conduct. For example, the Court determined in Dallas v. Stanglin 39
that social ballroom dancing was not entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion.4° Nevertheless, it is clear that the Supreme Court has regarded nude
dancing as a type of expression that should be granted some protection
under the First Amendment.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (flag burning); Texas v. John-
son, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (improper
use of flag by taping peace symbols on the flag); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (wearing black arm bands); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (dem-
onstrating by public library sit-in); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (flying a red
flag to demonstrate opposition to organized government).
33. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (upholding statute
prohibiting the knowing mutilation or destruction of Selective Service registration certificate,
when protester burned his certificate to protest war); FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Assn.,
493 U.S. 411 (1990) (upholding Sherman Act when asserted against person protesting low pay
for restraint of trade); cf United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1985) (prohibiting
the entry on a military base to protest war); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288 (1984) (prohibiting sleeping in parks where protestors sleeping in certain parks to
demonstrate against hopelessness).
34. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 397.
35, Id. at 406.
36. E.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981)("[N]ude dancing is
not without its First Amendment protections from official regulation."); but cf, California v.
LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972) (state could prohibit simultaneous sale of liquor and nude
dancing).
37. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
38. Id. at 932.
39. 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
40. Id. at 25.
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C. The O'Brien Test Measuring the Scope of First Amendment Protection
Given to Expressive Conduct
In United States v. O'Brien4' the Court refused to accept the argument
that expressive conduct was entitled to full First Amendment protection,
deciding that symbolic speech was entitled only to limited protection. Also,
the Court set out a four part balancing test to determine the level of protec-
tion that should be accorded such conduct.
The circumstances in O'Brien involved an anti-war demonstration, in
which the defendant O'Brien burned his Selective Service registration certifi-
cate on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse. Unfortunately for
O'Brien, the crowd that watched him burn his draft card included several
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents. The FBI agents arrested O'Brien,
who was later convicted of violating a federal statute prohibiting the know-
ing destruction of draft cards. On appeal to the Supreme Court, O'Brien
argued that he had burned the draft card for the purpose of demonstrating
against the war and the draft, and, therefore, his actions constituted pro-
tected symbolic speech within the meaning of the First Amendment guaran-
tee of freedom of expression.4 2
The Court rejected O'Brien's argument and upheld his conviction.4 3 The
Court stated that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements were inter-
twined within a single course of conduct, a substantially important govern-
mental interest"4 in regulating the "nonspeech" component of the expressive
conduct could excuse incidental restrictions on First Amendment rights.4 5
The Court then decided that the federal government did have a substantial
interest in preventing the destruction of draft cards.46
The Court employed a four-part inquiry to determine when a government
regulation was important enough to override First Amendment guarantees.
According to the Court, the government could constitutionally regulate ad-
mittedly expressive conduct: (1) if the law was within the constitutional
power of the government; (2) if the regulation furthered an important or
41. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
42. Id. at 369-72 & 376-86.
43. Id. at 386.
44. The Court has used several terms to describe the necessary quality of the governmen-
tal interest. Eg., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 444 (1963) ("compelling" and "sub-
stantial"); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) ("subordinating" and
"cogent"); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) ("paramount"); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963) ("strong").
45. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be
labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
express an idea. However, even on the assumption that the alleged communica-
tive element O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amend-
ment, it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration
certificate is constitutionally protected activity. This Court held that when
"speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of con-
duct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.
Id.
46. Id. at 377-82.
19921
SMU LAW REVIEW
substantial governmental interest; (3) if the important governmental interest
was unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms was no greater than was
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
47
Thus, in O'Brien the Court delineated the boundaries within which the
First Amendment protects expressive conduct. Governmental regulations
are bounded by the need for a substantial governmental interest; otherwise,
government may not regulate non-communicative aspects of symbolic con-
duct. The validity of the governmental interest can be determined by
O'Brien's four-part inquiry.4
D. The History of Public Indecency Laws in the United States
and Indiana
Dating back to the English common law, public nudity was considered a
criminal offense.49 The current Indiana public indecency statute50 was only
the latest of many general proscriptions on public nudity which Indiana had
enacted throughout its history.51 The laws typically barred "notorious lewd-
ness" or "indecent exposure."' 52 However, despite having an extensive his-
tory of enacting public indecency laws, Indiana had neither published
legislative histories concerning those laws nor explained the legislative intent
47. Id. at 376-77.
To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the
Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial, sub-
ordinating, paramount, cogent, strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these
terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it
is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.
Id.
48. For an interesting analysis of the O'Brien test, see John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A
Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1974).
49. See LeRoy v. Sidley, 82 Eng. Rep. 1036 (K.B. 1664) (public nudity considered im-
moral); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); 50 AM. JUR. 2D Lewdness, Indecency,
and Obscenity, § 17 (1970), G.R.B., Annotation, Criminal Offense Predicated Upon Indecent
Exposure, 93 A.L.R. 996, 997-88 (1934).
50. IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988). See supra note 2 for the relevant text of the Indiana
public indecency statute.
51. A brief chronology of Indiana's public indecency laws is as follows: Rev. Laws of Ind.,
ch. 26, § 60 (1831) (prohibiting "open and notorious lewdness, or ... grossly scandalous and
public indecency"); Ind. Rev. Stat. Pt. III, ch. 8, § 22 (1876 Rev.) (prohibiting "notorious
lewdness, or... grossly scandalous and public indecency"); Ind. Rev. Stat. pt. III, ch. 8, § 22
(1876 Rev.) (prohibiting "notorious lewdness.., or who shall, in any public place, make any
uncovered and indecent exposure of his or their person"); Ardery v. State, 56 Ind. 328 (1877)
(brief gap in statutory history filled by case law) (forbidding exhibition of "privates"); 1881
Ind. Acts, ch. 37, § 90 (remained unchanged until replaced with the present statute in 1976)
(defining an offender as "[W]hoever, being fourteen years of age, makes an indecent exposure
of his person in a public place, or in any place where there are other persons to be offended or
annoyed thereby").
52. See supra note 51 and accompanying text for the typical statutory language of Indi-




E. Purposes in General of Laws Regulating Nudity and Sexual Conduct
in Other Jurisdictions
Other legislatures that have enacted laws to control nudity, obscenity, or
sexual conduct have generally based their action on the state's traditional
police power to protect the public health, safety, and morals. 54 The United
States Supreme Court has endorsed such regulations by holding that a state
could enforce anti-obscenity laws enacted to protect "the societal interest in
order and morality."5 5 For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, where it upheld
a Georgia law prohibiting private homosexual sodomy, the Supreme Court
stated that "law ... is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all
laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the
Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed."'5 6 The Court has
also reviewed and sustained a city zoning ordinance that was explicitly con-
trived to suppress the allegedly unfavorable secondary effects associated with
adult theaters, such as crime and moral degradation. 57 Clearly, the state's
interest in decency, morality, and crime prevention has been one of the pri-
mary reasons that courts have cited to uphold laws regulating nudity and
sexual conduct.
II. BARNES v. GLEN THEATRE, INC.
Given this factual and legal background, the Supreme Court considered
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.. Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judg-
ment of the Court that enforcement of Indiana's public indecency statute
against nude dancing in adult entertainment businesses did not violate the
First Amendment right of freedom of speech despite the law's requirement
that the dancers wear pasties and G-strings while dancing.5 8 In considering
the constitutionality of the Indiana proscription, the Court addressed two
issues: (1) whether the nude dancing involved in this case could be consid-
53. Barnes v. Glen Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973).
54. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973).
55. Id. at 61 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), quoting Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
56. Bowers v. Hardwick, 467 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). The Court in Bowers upheld a law
prohibiting sodomy that was enacted solely on "the presumed belief of a majority of the electo-
rate in [the jurisdiction] that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable." Id. See also
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397, & n.6 (1984) (opinion of Bork, J.).
57. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986). "The ordinance by
its terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values,
and generally 'protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the city's] neighborhoods, commercial
districts, an the quality of urban life.' " Id. See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976) (zoning ordinance containing legislative findings that "a concentra-
tion of 'adult' movie theatres causes the area to deteriorate and become a focus of crime" held
constitutional); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 111 (1972) (administrative findings that
crime was associated with adult entertainment); United States v. Marren, 890 F.2d 924, 926
(7th Cir. 1989) (prostitution linked to nude barroom dancing); United States v. Doerr, 886
F.2d 944, 949 (7th Cir. 1989) (prostitution linked to nude barroom dancing).
58. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2458 (1991).
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ered expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, and if so,
(2) whether the public indecency law was unconstitutional when enforced
against such dancing.
A. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy deliv-
ered the plurality opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that nude
dancing was only marginally protected by the First Amendment. After ob-
serving that the statute passed all four prongs of the O'Brien test, Rehnquist
decided that the Indiana statute in question could be constitutionally en-
forced against nude barroom dancing.
1. Nude Dancing is Expressive Conduct Protected by the First
Amendment
Rehnquist first addressed the issue of whether the nude dancing involved
in this case was protected by the First Amendment and decided that it was.
Citing past Supreme Court decisions, 59 Rehnquist concluded that nude
dancing was "expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First
Amendment," and thus subject to some freedom of speech protection.6 °
2. The Public Indecency Law could be Constitutionally Enforced Against
Nude Dancers-The O'Brien Test
Having found nude barroom dancing was entitled to First Amendment
protection, Rehnquist went on to address the second issue: whether enforce-
ment of the Indiana public indecency statute against such nude dancing
would be constitutional. Because Rehnquist believed that nude dancing was
expressive conduct only "marginally" 6 1 protected by the First Amendment
he turned to the balancing test enunciated in United States v. O'Brien62 to
determine the requisite level of constitutional protection. Government could
constitutionally enforce a law incidentally regulating admittedly expressive
conduct if the law passed the O'Brien test.
Applying the O'Brien test to the facts in the case, Rehnquist found that
Indiana's public indecency statute was a justified restriction on nude danc-
ing. Addressing the first and second O'Brien requirements, Rehnquist suc-
cinctly stated that the law was "clearly within the constitutional power of
the government" 63 and that the statute furthered substantial government in-
terests. Noting that Indiana had never officially explained its purpose be-
hind this legislation," Rehnquist suggested a governmental interest which
he believed the Indiana legislature wished to promulgate through the en-
59. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1991); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,
422 U.S. 922 (1975); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
60. Barnes, 11 S. Ct. at 2460.
61. Id.
62. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).




forcement of the law. 65 Since public indecency laws historically were
designed to uphold morality, 66 Rehnquist proposed that Indiana's interest
behind its own nudity statute likewise was intended to protect "morals and
public order."' 67 Rehnquist noted that states had always possessed the au-
thority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals,68 and that the
Court had previously upheld this basis for legislation.69 Since the law was
promulgated to defend morality and order, he concluded that the nudity law
furthered the Indiana's valid interest in protecting morality in the state.70
Addressing the third O'Brien requirement, Rehnquist rejected the dis-
sent's argument that proscribing nudity for moral reasons was inherently
related to expression. Rehnquist concluded that the important governmen-
tal interest in protecting morality and public order was entirely unrelated to
suppressing free expression. 7'
The dissent argued that Indiana forbade nude dancing precisely because of
the erotic message conveyed by the dancers. The dissenters conceded that
proscribing public nudity in general would not necessarily be tied to sup-
pressing expression; however, they contended that Indiana's purpose in us-
ing the law to proscribe nude dancing was to restrict the erotic message
inherent in nude performance dancing. They reached this conclusion after
examining the state's implied assumption that the message would cause
harm to the public. According to the dissent, this assumption violated the
third prong of O'Brien, since the statute was drafted to suppress free
expression.72
. Rehnquist rejected this argument. He concluded that the erotic message
was substantially the same whether the dancers were semi-nude or totally
nude.73 For Rehnquist it was clear that the "speech" and "non-speech"
components of the expressive conduct at issue could be neatly separated.
The Chief Justice stated: "[T]he requirement that the dancers don pasties
and a G-string does not deprive the dance of whatever erotic message is
conveys; it simply makes the message slightly less graphic. The perceived
evil that Indiana seeks to address is not erotic dancing, but public nudity."74
For Rehnquist, therefore, the key distinction was that Indiana was at-
tempting to limit immoral conduct, not immoral expression. Only the ex-
pressive component of nude dancing was protected by the First Amendment.
65. Id. at 2462.
66. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text for discussion of historical purposes of
public indecency laws.
67. Barnes, Ill S. Ct. at 2462.
68. Id. "The traditional police power of the States is defined as the authority to provide
for the public health, safety, and morals, and we have upheld such a basis for legislation." Id.
69. Id. Rehnquist cited Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 485 (1957), and Bowers v. Hardwick, 467 U.S. 186 (1986), to support
his contention that the Court had accepted the justification of protection of morality as an
appropriate basis for a law. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462.
70. Barnes, I I1 S. Ct. at 2462.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2471-76 (White, J., dissenting).




Consequently, Indiana could enforce its statute to proscribe nudity, regard-
less of any incidental restriction on expression. The purpose behind the In-
diana law was to uphold morality. It upheld morality merely by regulating
conduct associated with immorality; thus, the statute could not be directly
related to suppressing the expression of eroticism. Importantly, the message
of eroticism could be conveyed by other legal means, including dancing with
pasties and G-strings. The dancers were free to express the message; only
their means of communication were restricted.
To support his argument, Rehnquist compared this case to the facts in
O'Brien.7 5 In O'Brien, the Court permitted the enforcement of a federal stat-
ute banning the knowing destruction of draft cards. 76 The individual
charged had burned his card to protest the war in Vietnam. The Court rec-
ognized that the plaintiff's burning of his draft card possessed an expressive
component. However, he was not convicted for the expressive component of
his action. Rather, O'Brien was convicted for his wrongful conduct of de-
stroying the draft card. 77 Drawing the same distinction, Rehnquist similarly
concluded that the Indiana public indecency statute punished only wrongful
conduct and not expression. "So here with the Indiana statute; while the
dancing to which it was applied had a communicative element, it was not the
dancing that was prohibited, but simply its being done in the nude." a78 Rely-
ing on this distinction, Rehnquist concluded that Indiana's law was unre-
lated to suppressing expression.
Addressing the fourth and final requirement of the O'Brien test, Rehn-
quist found that the incidental restriction on the constitutionally protectable
expressive activity was no greater than necessary to further the governmen-
tal interest. 79 Indiana's interest was to protect morality, and according to
Rehnquist, requiring the dancers merely to wear scant clothing while danc-
ing constituted exactly the "bare minimum necessary to achieve the state's
purpose" of upholding morality.8 0
Finding that Indiana's public indecency law met all four prongs of the
O'Brien test, Rehnquist was satisfied that it could be constitutionally en-
forced against nude dancing in order to protect public order and morality.
75. Id. at 2464 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367).
76. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of O'Brien.
77. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463.
This Court upheld [O'brien's] conviction, reasoning that the continued availabil-
ity of issued certificates served a legitimate and substantial purpose in the ad-
ministration of the selective service system. O'Brien's deliberate destruction of
his certificate frustrated this purpose and "for this non-communicative aspect of
his conduct, and for nothing else, he was convicted."




The statutory prohibition is not a means to some greater end, but an end in
itself. It is without cavil that the public indecency statute is "narrowly tai-
lored;" Indiana's requirement that the dancers wear at least pasties and a G-




Justice Scalia agreed with the judgment, but decided that the Indiana
nudity statute was not subject to any freedom of speech scrutiny. Whereas
Chief Justice Rehnquist felt that the law was at least marginally protected by
the First Amendment, Scalia believed it a general law regulating conduct
and not specifically directed at expression. Thus the statute was removed
from the realm of any First Amendment protection.8 1 Concluding that the
actual text of the statute did not explicitly make expression or communica-
tion a required element of the crime of public nudity, Scalia found that the
law did not violate the First Amendment.8 2
1. Indiana's Public Indecency Law Did Not Directly Aim at Prohibiting
Expression
Scalia first concluded that the public indecency law was not directed in
particular at suppressing expression.8 3 To support this argument, Scalia
pointed to the lengthy history of public indecency laws in the United States
and in Indiana. Scalia found that the Supreme Court generally had not in-
validated laws proscribing public nudity because of conflict with the First
Amendment right of freedom of expression. 84 The Indiana statute had
changed little since 1831 and was part of this long tradition of laws restrict-
ing public nudity.8 5 Rather than singling out only public nudity which
could express an idea, these laws prohibited all public nudity.86 Likewise,
the current Indiana law was also a general proscription on public nudity.
Consistent with his point, Scalia conceded that, had the statute been en-
forced solely against expressive public nudity and not at non-communicative
nudity, then the enforcement of the law could have been described as being
directly targeted at restricting free expression.8 7 But this was not the case
here. The statute was enforced against public nudity in general-expressive
81. Id. at 2463 (Scalia, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 2464.
The intent to convey a "message of eroticism" (or any other message) is not a
necessary element of the statutory offense of public indecency; nor does one
commit that statutory offense by conveying the most explicit "message of eroti-
cism," so long as he does not commit any of the four specified acts in the
process."
Id. See supra note 2 for the "four specified acts" proscribed by the statute: sexual intercourse,
deviate sexual conduct, nudity, and fondling genitals in public.
83. Barnes, I I S. Ct. at 2464.
84. Id. Public indecency laws date back to English common law and, according to Scalia,
are in integral part of the American legal system. Id.
85. Id. "Indiana's statute is in the line of a long tradition of laws against public nudity,
which have never been thought to run afoul of traditional understanding of 'the freedom of
speech.' " Id.
86. See supra note 51 for the relevant text of past Indiana public indecency statutes.
87. Barnes, Ill S.Ct. at 2464. "Were it the case that Indiana in practice targeted only
expressive nudity, while turning a blind eye to nude beaches and unclothed purveyors of hot
dogs and machine tools . . . it might be said that what posed as a regulation of conduct in
general was in reality a regulation of only communicative conduct." Id. (citation omitted).
Scalia's reference to "nude beaches and unclothed purveyors" came from Judge Easterbrook's
dissent in Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1120 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easter-
brook, J., dissenting): "Indiana does to regulate dancing. It regulates public nudity .....
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and non-expressive-and not against expressive nudity only.88  Therefore,
Scalia found that the law was not enacted for the precise purpose of restrict-
ing expression.
Scalia then attacked the dissent's argument that the actual purpose behind
enforcing the public indecency law was to suppress the erotic expression in-
herent in nude performance dancing.89 According to the dissent, there
could be multiple purposes behind such a law. The dissent posited that the
purpose behind a truly general proscription on all public nudity would be to
protect the general public from seeing offensive activities. When the law was
applied to proscribe nude performance dancing, however, the purpose be-
hind the law could not be to protect other people from offense, since only
consenting adults were exposed to nude dancing. Therefore, the dissent con-
cluded that the purpose behind this particular application of the nudity law
had to be suppression of the expressive elements of nude barroom dancing. 90
Scalia took issue with the dissent's argument that "offense to others" was
the primary purpose behind a general law regulating all public nudity.9'
Scalia found the purpose behind the statute was not to prevent nude dancers
from offending others; rather, the purpose was to protect morality in Indi-
ana. Scalia stressed that this purpose was supported by the fact that the
Constitution as a whole had never prevented a state from simply regulating
morality without an express provision in the Constitution doing so.86 In
fact, states had long been allowed to prohibit many activities on the grounds
that they were considered immoral. 92
Scalia pointed out that, traditionally, the discriminate exposure of ones
genitals in front of another, including consenting adults, was considered im-
moral. The Indiana statute sought only to prevent such conflict. Therefore,
it was constitutionally permissible. 93 The dissent had argued that the pur-
pose behind the statute in general was prevention of offense to others and
that the purpose behind enforcing the statute against nude barroom dancers
necessarily was to restrict expression. Scalia found that this conclusion was
without foundation. 94
Almost the entire domain of Indiana's statute is unrelated to expression, unless we view nude
beaches and topless hot dog venders as speech." Id.
88. Barnes, Ill S. Ct. at 2464. See also supra note 4 for a list of cases in which Indiana
used the Indiana public indecency law to proscribe non-expressive conduct.
89. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2465.
90. Id. at 2473-76 (White, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2465.
[T]here is no basis for thinking that our society has ever shared that
Thoreauvian "you - may - do - what - you- like - so - long - as - it - does - not -
injure - someone - else" beau ideal-much less for thinking that it was written
into the Constitution. The purpose of Indiana's nudity law would be violated, I
think, if 60,000 fully consenting adults crowded into the Hoosierdome to display
their genitals to one another, even if there were not an offended innocent in the
crowd.
Id.
92. Id. ("sadomasochism, cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use, prostitution, and
sodomy").
93. Id.
94. Scalia defined the term "general law" to mean a law that regulated "conduct without
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2. Indiana's Enforcement of the Statute Should Not Be Subject to First
Amendment Scrutiny
Scalia next decided that because the public indecency statute was not spe-
cifically directed at restricting expression, Indiana's use of the law did not
give the Court cause to consider any freedom of speech issues. The law was
a general law regulating conduct and only obliquely regulated expression.
Consequently, there was no basis for the argument that First Amendment
rights were violated.95
The text of the Constitution expressly states that protection shall be ex-
tended to "freedom of speech."'9 6 Scalia opined that the framers meant only
oral and written speech, not "expressive conduct. '97 Accordingly, any regu-
lation of oral or written speech should be given full First Amendment scru-
tiny, regardless of whether the direct purpose of the law was to suppress
expression of ideas. 98 A law that prohibited conduct, which was not directed
at suppressing expression, however, did not raise any First Amendment is-
sues. Scalia asserted that every regulatory scheme restricted conduct in
some fashion and all conduct could arguably communicate a message.99 Ac-
cordingly, any application of a freedom of speech standard to such a great
range of laws would be unreasonable. He therefore concluded that neither
the normal First Amendment examination nor the "substantial governmen-
tal interest" test of O'Brien applied to determine the correct level of First
Amendment protection. °° Either test would be unreasonable and burden-
some for the courts to apply.
Clearly, Scalia was aware of past decisions in which the Court had applied
the O'Brien balancing test though conduct was expressive; nevertheless, he
rejected the application of the test to a situation where the statute was sim-
ply a general law not explicitly directed at suppressing expression.t0t Ac-
cording to Scalia, the Supreme Court had never required the application of a
substantial governmental interest test weighing the state's interest in enforc-
ing a general proscription against possible expressive conduct, nor had the
Court mandated the invalidation of such enforcement merely because the
state's interests were not substantial enough to support the enforcement.102
regard to whether that conduct is expressive." Id. at 2465 n.3. He rejected the dissent's defini-
tion that a law could be "general" only if it restricted "the targeted conduct in all places at all
times." Id. The fact that Indiana prohibited public nudity but not nudity within the privacy
of one's own home was irrelevant for the purposes of his argument, because traditional notions
of morality frowned upon only public, not private, nudity. Only public nudity was considered
immoral. Id.
95. Id. at 2465.
96. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
97. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2465.
98. See supra note 30 and accompanying text for examples of cases which involved oral or
written speech.
99. According to Scalia, all conduct could be labeled expressive, if only for the fact that
the actor was protesting the law by engaging in the proscribed activity. Barnes, I ll S. Ct. at
2466.





Scalia recognized that freedom of speech would prevent the enforcement
of laws that' restricted expressive conduct. However, for Scalia, the issue was
whether the actual, direct, and underlying purpose of the statute in issue was
to suppress communication or expression.' 0 3 Consistent with this interpre-
tation, Scalia noted that the Court had upheld other laws proscribing expres-
sive conduct when the regulation resulted in an incidental restriction on the
activity and when the incidental restriction was for reasons other than the
direct suppression of expression. 1° 4 In these cases, the object of the laws
proscribing expressive conduct was not to restrict communication, but rather
to promote other valid governmental objectives. 105
Thus, for Scalia, the inquiry should begin with an evaluation of the actual
purpose of the law in question. If the underlying purpose of the law was
unrelated to the direct suppression of communication, then the Court was
not required to apply a First Amendment standard in its evaluation of the
law. But if the purpose behind the law was explicitly to proscribe expression
of the messages communicated in certain conduct, then and only then, did
the First Amendment come into play.'16 According to Scalia, this was the
appropriate and reasonable test because it achieved a balance. Scalia's test
103. Id. Scalia cited several cases to support his claim that only statutes with the explicit
purpose of restricting expressive conduct would be held unconstitutional. In United States v.
Eichman, the Supreme Court found a federal law prohibiting flag burning unconstitutional.
110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990). In Texas v. Johnson, the Court invalidated application of a state law
designed to prevent expressive flag burning when Johnson burned a flag to protest the Reagan
administration's policies. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). In Spence v. Washington, the Court held un-
constitutional enforcement of a law preventing flag desecration when the defendant put a peace
symbol on his flag. 418 U.S. 405 (1974). Additionally, in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com-
munity Sch. Dist., the Court refused to uphold a school policy banning students from wearing
black armbrands to protest the Vietnam war. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Brown v. Louisiana, the
Court invalidated application of a law preventing silent sit-in protests in a "whites only" li-
brary. 383 U.S. 131 (1966). In Stromberg v. California, the court held unconstitutional a law
prohibiting the display of a red flag to voice opposition to the government. 283 U.S. 359
(1931). In each of these cases, the Court found that the implicit purpose behind the laws in
question was direct suppression of expression.
104. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466. Scalia cited several cases supporting his assertion that laws
only incidentally regulating expressive conduct, but not directed at restricting such conduct,
were upheld by the court, including the following: O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (law
preventing draft card burning); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 493 U.S.
411 (1990) (Sherman Act prohibiting protests as restraint of trade); United States v. Albertini,
472 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1985) (rule indirectly barring protests on military base); Clark v. Com-
munity for Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (rule indirectly preventing protests in parks).
105. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466.
106. Id. at 2467. It is interesting that Scalia cited one of his own dissenting opinions to
support his assertion that the test as to whether a law restricting expressive conduct was valid
depended on whether the law was explicitly designed to suppress communication.
All our holdings (though admittedly not some of our discussion) support the
conclusion that "the only First Amendment analysis applicable to laws that do
not directly or indirectly impede speech is the threshold inquiry of whether the
purpose of the law is to suppress communication. If not, that is the end of the
matter so far as First Amendment guarantees are concerned; if so, the court
then proceeds to determine whether there is substantial justification for the
proscription."
Id. (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622-23 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (en banc) (Scalia, J., dissenting), re'd, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288 (1984)).
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prevented the government from violating First Amendment rights, but at the
same time, it did not subject every conduct regulating law to strict First
Amendment scrutiny. 107
Scalia analogized the issue of protection of free speech in expressive con-
duct to another First Amendment guarantee-free exercise of religion.10 8
According to Scalia, in free exercise cases' ° 9 the Court had upheld general
laws which were not directly aimed at regulating religious practices, despite
some incidental restrictions placed on practicing those religions which were
produced by those laws. Not only did the Court uphold these laws, but it
also refused to subject them to any First Amendment scrutiny. 0
Scalia believed that similar tests were warranted in cases involving laws
allegedly proscribing expressive conduct or free exercise. The initial inquiry
should begin by deciding whether the law restricting activity was explicitly
intended to suppress First Amendment rights. If so, then the Court could
apply heightened First Amendment scrutiny to the regulation."'
3. The Court Should Not Have Applied a "Substantial Government
Interest" Test
As indicated above, Scalia disputed the plurality's application of a "sub-
stantial government interest" test such as the one in O'Brien.112 Scalia be-
lieved that it was not the role of the Court to evaluate the "importance" of a
government's interests behind a law. This was especially true when the pur-
pose of the law was to protect morality." 13 Rather, the Court should uphold
such a proscription on nudity whenever the legislature has a rational basis
for supplying the law. 114 In this case, the rational basis provided by the
Indiana legislature was the protection of societal morality.' 15
Scalia would approve the use of the Indiana public indecency statute to
curb barroom dancing despite the communicative aspects of the dancing.
107. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2467.
108. U.S. CoNsT. amend I.
109. E.g., Employment Div., Or. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595,
1603 (1990) ("The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially
harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, 'cannot depend on
measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual develop-
ment.' ") (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439, 451
(1988)); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.) ("Con-
scientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved
the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of
religious beliefs.").
110. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. 2467.
111. Id. "In the one case, as in the other, if the law is not directed against the protected
value (religion or expression) the law must be obeyed." Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2468.
115. Id. Scalia disagreed with the plurality's claim that Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton and
Bowers v. Hardwick, see supra notes 54 and 56, required the application of an "important
government interests" test. The cases upheld laws proscribing conduct for moral reasons, but
"neither opinion held that those concerns were particularly 'important' or 'substantial,' or
amounted to anything more than a rational basis for regulation." Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2468.
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The purpose of the statute was directed only at conduct, not at expression.
Consequently, the statute was beyond the parameters of First Amendment
scrutiny. If the dancers wished to communicate by dancing, then had to do
so by a lawful means, not by unlawfully dancing nude."
6
C. Souter's Concurrence
Justice Souter also concurred with the judgment and with the application
of the O'Brien balancing test for determining what level of First Amend-
ment protection should be allotted to the nudity law. However, he disagreed
with Rehnquist's assertion that the purpose of the statute was protection of
morality. Rather, Souter believed that the substantial governmental interest
in enforcing the statute against nude dancers was the prevention of direct
and secondary crime and odious activities which accompanied nude dancing
parlors. '' 7
1. Nude Dancing is Expressive Conduct Subject to Some First
Amendment Protection
According to Souter, nude dancing was one of several forms of dance that
fall into the category of expressive conduct and was therefore entitled to
First Amendment protection.' 1 8 In contrast, social ballroom dancing and
aerobic exercise dancing would not usually be categorized as expressive ac-
tivities protected by the First Amendment, because these dances were not
generally used to convey ideas." 19 If the ballroom dancing was done in the
nude, however, it would be considered expressive conduct subject to strict
scrutiny.
Souter asserted that all dancing performed before an audience emitted
some kind of inherent emotional expression, because the dancers usually in-
tended to communicate. Likewise, semi-nude or totally nude performance
dancing could be considered expressive conduct because the dancers in-
tended to convey the message of eroticism.' 20 For Souter, since eroticism
was the "speech" element involved in the "conduct" of nude dancing this
speech element was entitled to First Amendment protection.
Souter added an important caveat to his conclusion that nude perform-
ance dancing was inherently expressive: the simple physical state of being
116. Barnes, II1 S. Ct. at 2468.
Indiana may constitutionally enforce its prohibition of public nudity even
against those who choose to use public nudity as a means of communication.
The State is regulating conduct, not expression, and those who choose to employ
conduct as a means of expression must make sure that the conduct they select is
not generally forbidden.
Id.
117. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
118. Id.
119. Id. Justice Souter cited Dallas v. Stranglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24-25 (1989), as an example
of a case where the Supreme Court had specifically held that social dancing was not expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment.
120. Barnes, I II S. Ct. at 2468 ("carrying an endorsement of erotic experience").
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nude was not in and of itself inherently expressive. 121 When the condition of
nudity and the expressive conduct of performance dancing were combined,
however, the value of the expression of eroticism present in regular semi-
nude dancing would be enhanced by the dancer's nudity. 122 It was because
of this enhancement that Souter concluded that nude dancing was protected
to a limited extent by the First Amendment.
2. The Correct Test Should Be O'Brien, But the State's Interest was
Crime Prevention, Not Protection of Morality
Souter also agreed with the plurality that the O'Brien balancing test was
the correct analysis to apply in this case to measure the level of protection
afforded to nude dancing.' 23 He disagreed, however, with Rehnquist's asser-
tion that Indiana's only purpose behind the law was to uphold social moral-
ity. Rather, Souter believed that the state was interested in preventing the
harmful secondary effects that nude dancing establishments brought about,
such as crime and prostitution. 24
Souter acknowledged that neither the Indiana legislature nor its courts
had ever stated any purpose behind Indiana's public indecency law, and
maintained that the purpose offered by Chief Justice Rehnquist could be a
rational justification for the law. 125 Nevertheless, Souter thought that the
Court should not limit itself "in identifying the justification for the legisla-
tion at issue here, and may legitimately consider petitioners' assertion that
the statute is applied to nude dancing because such dancing 'encourag[es]
prostitution, increas[es] sexual assaults, and attract[s] other criminal
activity.' "126
To Souter, the Court should not have focused on the actual motivation of
the Indiana legislature when it passed the statute. Rather, the Court should
have looked for a current governmental interest that would support the use
of the nudity law to regulate nude dancing. 27 Souter cited O'Brien as stand-
ing for the proposition that the Court should not find a statute unconstitu-
tional simply because a state legislature had not specified wise reasons for its
actions. 12 8 Instead, the Court should examine current justifications for the
statute to determine whether the state has a substantial governmental inter-
121. Id. "Although such performance dancing is inherently expressive, nudity per se is
not." Id. "It is a condition, not an activity, and the voluntary assumption of that condition,
without more, apparently expresses nothing beyond the view that the condition is somehow
appropriate to the circumstances." Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2468 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
124. Id. at 2469.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. "Our appropriate focus is not an empirical inquiry into the actual intent of the
enacting legislature, but rather the existence or not of a current government interest in the
service of which the challenged application of the statute may be constitutional." Id.
128. Id. "We decline to void [a statute] essentially on the ground that it is unwise legisla-
tion which [the legislature] had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in
its exact form if the same or another legislator made 'wiser' speech about it." O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 384 (1968).
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est advanced by the law. Applying this rule, Souter. concluded that Indi-
ana's interests in "preventing prostitution, sexual assault, and other criminal
activity" was enough justification to use the Indiana public indecency statute
to proscribe nude dancing, even though these reasons may not have been the
interests contemplated by the legislature at the time the law was passed. 129
Having determined Indiana's interest, Souter applied the O'Brien test to
determine the level of First Amendment protection that should be granted to
the expressive conduct of nude barroom dancing. As previously discussed,
the first prong required that the statute be within the constitutional power of
the state to enact. The second prong required that the law further a substan-
tial state interest. The third prong required that the state interest be unre-
lated to suppressing expression. And the fourth prong required that the
restriction on expression be no greater than necessary to accomplish the
state's interest. 130
Considering the first prong, Souter stated that the power to prevent crime
was clearly resided in the Indiana legislature by the state's constitution. 13'
As to the second prong, Souter concluded that the governmental interest in
preventing crime was indeed substantial and that the statute furthered that
substantial state interest.1 32
Souter cited to Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 133 to support his argu-
ment that the nudity statute furthered the state interest of crime prevention.
In Renton the Court upheld a city zoning ordinance that restricted the right
of adult movie theaters to locate within 1000 feet of a residence, school,
park, or church.1 34 The stated purpose of the law was to uphold family
values and to prevent crime supposedly associated with adult establishments.
Interestingly, the Court allowed the city of Renton to base its connection
between adult entertainment and crime on findings by other cities. Further,
the Court did not require Renton to establish a nexus between crime and
pornography by conducting its own studies on local adult movie theaters.13 5
Souter used Renton to support his conclusion that states could simply as-
sume that crime and prostitution would decrease if they enacted statutes
regulating nudity and sexual behavior. 136
In light of Renton's recognition that legislation seeking to combat the
secondary effects of adult entertainment need not await localized proof
of those effects, the State of Indiana could reasonably conclude that
forbidding nude entertainment of the type offered at the Kitty Kat
Lounge and the Glen Theatre's bookstore furthered its interest in
preventing prostitution, sexual assault, and associated crimes. 137
129. Barnes, II1 S. Ct. at 2469.
130. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77. See supra text accompanying notes 41-48 for a discus-
sion of O'Brien.
131. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2469.
132. Id.
133. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
134. Id. at 43.
135. Id.
136. Barnes, III S. Ct. at 2469.
137. Id. at 2470.
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Indiana had a constitutional and substantial governmental interest in
preventing crime and it asserted in its argument that it was enforcing the
public indecency law against nude dancing to prevent crime. For Souter,
this was sufficient to find that the law furthered the state interest in prevent-
ing crime. 138
Addressing the third prong of O'Brien, Souter concluded that the substan-
tial governmental interest in preventing crime was unrelated to suppressing
expression. 139 The dissent argued that if Indiana sought to proscribe nude
dancing because of the secondary effects caused by such dancing, the state
was in reality attempting to regulate the expression of eroticism by the danc-
ers. The dissent believed that Indiana assumed that the ideas communicated
by nude dancing would lead nude dancing patrons to commit crime and that
this was the actual motivation behind the law. Therefore, the dissent as-
serted that the law was directly related to suppressing communication.140
Souter disagreed with the dissent's argument that Indiana necessarily as-
sumed a direct connection between the expressive content of nude dancing
and the secondary effects associated with nude dancing establishments.14 1
Souter then advanced other possible reasons that crime could increase
around adult entertainment areas. 142 In Souter's mind, an increase in crime
could be related more to the greater numbers of men predisposed to crime
and prostitution congregating at adult entertainment locales than to any sup-
posed effects of erotic expression on men watching nude dancing. 143 In this
example, the crimes committed would not be instigated by any message the
dancers conveyed, but rather would be the simple result of more "bad" peo-
ple congregating in a particular area. This reason, then, clearly was not re-
lated to suppressing expression.
Again, Souter pointed to Renton for support. In Renton the Court chose
not to attempt to determine if the communicative effect of the pornographic
movies on movie viewers was the proximate cause of increased crime or de-
creased morality. Rather, the Court concluded that the ordinance was "con-
tent neutral" and was unrelated to suppressing communication. 144 In other
words, the ordinance in Renton was "justified without reference to the con-
138. Id. In a footnote, Souter acknowledged that a state may not be able to enforce its
public indecency statute against a fully artistic or theatrical production, such as "Hair" or
"Equus," if the state could not present a rational state interest in prohibiting such an activity.
Souter noted that it would be difficult to understand how artistic or theatrical nude dancing
would foster its viewers to commit crime. Id. at 2470 n.2.
139. Id. at 2470.
140. Id. at 2474 (White, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 2470.
To say that pernicious secondary effects are associated with nude dancing estab-
lishments is not necessarily to say that such effects result from the persuasive
effect of the expression inherent in nude dancing. It is to say, rather, only that
the effects are correlated with the existence of establishments offering such danc-
ing, without deciding what the precise causes of the correlation actually are.
Id.
142. Note that it was enough for Souter to simply assume that there actually was an in-
creased crime and prostitution rate within adult entertainment locations.
143. Id. at 2471.
144. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.
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tent of the regulated speech."'' 45
Similarly, Souter concluded Indiana's interest in preventing the odious
secondary effects of nude barroom dancing was unrelated to suppressing ex-
pression. The Indiana statute was also "content neutral" and "justified
without reference to the content of the regulated expression." 1 46 Thus, Sou-
ter held that the enforcement of the public indecency statute against nude
dancing in adult entertainment establishments satisfied the third O'Brien re-
quirement that the governmental interest be unrelated to suppressing
expression. ' 47
Turning to the fourth O'Brien prong, that the restriction be no greater
than necessary to achieve the state's objectives, Souter succinctly concluded
that the requirement that dancers wear scant clothing-pasties and a G-
string-was the bare minimum required to further Indiana's interest in
preventing crime and prostitution and other pernicious secondary effects of
nude dancing.' 48 The dancers could still communicate the message of eroti-
cism either by semi-nude dance or by simple verbal expression.' 49
For these reasons, Souter found the application of Indiana's public inde-
cency statute to nude performance dancing constitutional. He disagreed
with the plurality only on the identification of Indiana's interest supporting
the nudity law. He decided that it was designed to prevent the pernicious
secondary effects of nude dancing, not to protect morality.
D. White's Dissent
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dis-
sented and categorized the Court's reasoning as "transparently errone-
ous."150 White agreed with the plurality that nude dancing was protected by
the First Amendment, but he took issue with the plurality's application of
the O'Brien balancing test to the facts in the case. White concluded that it
was precisely because of the supposedly harmful erotic message conveyed by
nude dancing that Indiana wanted to prohibit the activity. 1 5'
1. Non-Obscene Nude Dancing is Protected by the First Amendment
White first concluded that nude dancing was protected by the freedom of
speech.'52 "This is no more than recognizing, as the Seventh Circuit ob-
145. Id.
146. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2471. Souter reached this conclusion after noting that "protec-
tion of sexually explicit expression may be of lesser societal importance that the protection of
other forms of expression." Id. at 2471 n.3. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 49 & n.2, (citing Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)).
147. Barnes, Ill S. Ct. at 2471.
148. Id.
149. "Dropping the final stitch is prohibited, but the limitation is minor when measured
against the dancer's remaining capacity and opportunity to express the erotic message. Nor
... is the dancer or her employer limited ... from expressing an erotic message by articulate
speech or representational means." Id.
150. Id. at 2474 (White, J., dissenting).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2471.
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served, that dancing is an ancient art form and 'inherently embodies the
expression and communication of ideas and emotions.' "153 To White, all
performance dancing--dancing before an audience-was inherently expres-
sive.' 5 4 White therefore rejected Scalia's assertion that performance dancing
was not in fact inherently expressive. 155
2. There Were No Valid Substantial Government Interests Supporting the
Enforcement of Indiana's Public Indecency Statute Against
Nude Dancing
White next disputed the correctness of the plurality's application of the
O'Brien test to the facts in the case. The plurality concluded that the Indi-
ana statute satisfied all four prongs of O'Brien and held that the state had
overriding governmental interests in proscribing nude dancing. 156 White
disagreed. To the contrary, he contended that the substantial state interests
asserted by the plurality were invalid and that Indiana, in fact, did not have
any constitutionally valid reasons to enforce the law against nude
dancing. 157
White distinguished the authority relied upon by the Court from the cir-
cumstances in this case.' 58 On one hand, previous Supreme Court cases
which had upheld proscriptions on expressive conduct had involved nothing
less than truly general prohibitions of individual conduct. 59 On the other
hand, in this case, Indiana's public indecency statute was something less
than the general proscription analogous to the authority mentioned by the
Court. Although, on its face, the statute appeared to be a general proscrip-
tion, in actuality, it was not, since the Indiana Supreme Court presumably
had forbidden the enforcement of the statute against genuinely artistic or
theatrical performances. 160 The actual text of the nudity law also supported
White's argument that the statute was not a truly general proscription. Be-
153. Id. at 2471 (quoting Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir.
1990)).
154. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2471 n. 1. White cited several definitions of dance to support his
statement that dance is inherently expressive. E.g., 16 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITAN-
NICA 935 (1989) (Dance is "the art of moving the body in a rhythmical way, usually to music,
to express an emotion or idea, to narrate a story, or simply to take delight in the movement
itself."); JOHN JOSEPH MARTIN, INTRODUCTION TO THE DANCE, (1939) (dancing enshrines
"the common impulse to resort to movement to externalize states which we cannot externalize
by rational means. This is basic dance.").
155. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2471 n. I. "Justice [Scalia] also asserts that even if dancing is
inherently expressive, nudity is not. The statement may be true, but it tells us nothing about
dancing in the nude." Id.
156. Id. at 2472.
157. Id. at 2474.
158. E.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Bowers v. Hardwick, 467 U.S. at
186 (1986); Employment Comm'n, Oregon Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
159. In O'Brien, the Court upheld a total prohibition on destroying draft cards anywhere
and anytime. 391 U.S. at 367. In Bowers, the Court upheld a law involving a total ban on
homosexual sodomy, again wherever and when ever it occurred. 468 U.S. at 186.
160. State v. Bayslinger, 397 N.E.2d 580 (1979). There was no "evidence that the State has
attempted to apply the statute to nudity in performances such as plays, ballets or operas."
Barnes, I I S. Ct. at 2473.
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cause it proscribed only public nudity, not nudity in the privacy of one's own
home, it could not be said that the Indiana statute was a general statute
proscribing all conduct of a certain type. 16
According to White, this was a substantial distinction. Since Indiana had
chosen to enact a less than general law, the Court should have examined the
law with an even stricter scrutiny than that required for a truly general
law. 1 62 "In other words, when the State enacts a law which draws a line
between expressive conduct which is regulated and nonexpressive conduct of
the same type which is not regulated, O'Brien places the burden on the State
to justify the distinctions it has made." 63 White believed that the Court was
required to "carefully examine the reasons the state has chosen to regulate
this expressive conduct with less than a general statute."' 64 Therefore,
White identified what he believed to be the actual purposes behind Indiana's
nudity law.
Rehnquist and Scalia thought that the purpose of the statute, however,
was simply to protect morality, and Souter felt that its purpose was to pre-
vent crime. 165 For White, there could be multiple purposes for a public
indecency law depending on the circumstances of its enforcement. Accord-
ing to White, when Indiana used the nudity law to combat nudity in parks,
beaches, and other openly public places, the purpose of the law was to pre-
vent nude people from offending others.' 66 However, when the state used
the law to counter nude dancing, the "offense to others" purpose could no
longer apply, since those watching were always consenting adults wishing to
view this kind of entertainment. 167 According to White, Indiana was actu-
ally attempting to prevent the communication of the perceived harmful
message conveyed by the dancers to the viewers. When Indiana asserted
that it wanted to prevent crime, it was inherently assuming a direct connec-
tion between the erotic message and any resulting increase in crime or de-
struction of moral values. In White's opinion, any attempt to prevent crime
or maintain morality by proscribing nude dancing depended directly on sup-
pressing the expressive content inherent in nude dancing. 16 8
a. White Challenges Rehnquist and Souter
Given this analysis, White felt that the Court was especially erroneous in
its conclusion that the third O'Brien prong-that the substantial governmen-
tal interest behind the statute be unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion-was satisfied. 169 The Court made the distinction that it was only the
condition of nudity that was banned, not the erotic message, and the evil the
161. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2472. "By contrast, in this case, Indiana does not suggest that its
statute applies to, or could be applied to, nudity wherever it occurs, including the home." Id.
162. Id. at 2473.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2461, 2469.
166. Id. at 2473.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2474.
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state wished to prevent was nudity, not communicative erotic dancing.' 70
For the plurality, proscribing public nudity was clearly not related to sup-
pressing expression.
White thought the plurality's argument was "transparently erroneous."' 7'
Noting that even the Court had admitted that nude dancing could convey an
erotic message and that the lack of nudity could mute the presentation of the
erotic message in nude dancing,172 White believed that the element of nudity
had to be considered an integral component of the erotic expression.173 In
other words, White asserted that there was a distinct difference in the value
of the erotic message that depended on whether the dancers were clothed or
nude. It was because of this difference that Indiana sought to proscribe nude
dancing. According to White, Indiana had to assume that the feelings and
emotions generated by nude dancing were more likely to create greater crime
and morality problems than the feelings created by mere semi-nude danc-
ing.' 74 White, therefore, concluded that this was why the Court had to find
the statute directly related to suppressing expression: producing feeling and
emotion was the definition of expression. According to White, the condition
of nudity in nude dancing could not be "neatly pigeonholed as mere 'con-
duct' independent of any expressive component of the dance.' 75
Given this fact, White asserted that the level of First Amendment protec-
tion depended on the independent communicative impact of nude danc-
ing. 176 Supreme Court authority1 77 required that any "content based"'178
restriction be sustained only if narrowly drawn to accomplish an important
state interest.' 79 According to White, this statute restricted nude dancing
170. Id. at 2463.
17 1. Id. at 2474.
172. Id.
[T]he message would be muted if the dancers wore pasties and G-strings. In-
deed, the emotional or erotic impact of the dance is intensified by the nudity of
the performers. . . . The sight of a fully clothed, or even partially clothed,
dancer generally will have a far different impact on a spectator than that of a
nude dancer, even if the same dance is performed. The nudity is itself an expres-




Since the State permits the dancers to perform if they wear pasties and G-strings
but forbids nude dancing, it is precisely because of the distinctive, expressive
content of the nude dancing performances at issue in this case that the State
seeks to apply the statutory prohibition. It is only because nude dancing per-
formances may generate emotions and feelings of eroticism and sensuality
among the spectators that the State seeks to regulate such expressive activity,
apparently on the assumption that creating or emphasizing such thought and





177. E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v.
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).




precisely on the basis of its inherent expressive content.180 Being a "content
based" restriction, the Indiana law could be upheld only if narrowly drawn.
And the Indiana law was not narrowly drawn.' 8'
Furthermore, even if the statute were supported by a compelling govern-
mental interest, it was not the minimal restriction required to uphold moral-
ity or to prevent crime. 182 White believed the state could have restricted
nude dancing in ways that would not result in suppressing expression, but
would still be effective in allowing Indiana to enforce its moral values under
its police power. As an example, White observed that if Indiana was trying
to prevent crime, it could have enacted time, place, or manner restrictions on
adult entertainment establishments,' 8 3 or it could have criminalized prosti-
tution and other crimes supposedly associated with nude dancing, 184 or in-
creased the penalties for violating those penal laws. If nude dancing in
businesses selling alcoholic beverages, as distinguished from other establish-
ments, was Indiana's concern, the state could have banned nude dancing in
those establishments selling alcohol through the Twenty-first
Amendment. 85
Thus, White found no compelling state interests supporting the applica-
tion of the statute to nude dancing. Therefore, he believed that any at-
tempted enforcement of the statute against nude dancing could not pass the
"substantial governmental interest" test.
b. White Tackles Scalia
White then turned his attention to Scalia's opinion that the nudity law was
not subject to any First Amendment scrutiny at all in this case, since it was a
general law not specifically directed at suppressing expression.1 86 White be-
lieved that Scalia's argument "suffer[ed] from the same defects" as the plu-
rality's argument. 87 According to White, the Indiana statute was not, in
fact, the general law proscribing all conduct of a certain type that Scalia had
contended it to be.' 8 8 Contesting Scalia's hypothetical that 60,000 people
would not be allowed to parade nude in the Hoosierdome because public
nudity was considered immoral, 18 9 White retorted with the assertion that
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2475.
182. Id.
183. Id. "For instance, the State could perhaps require that, while performing, nude per-
formers remain at all times a certain minimum distance from spectators, that nude dancing be
limited to certain hours, or even that establishments providing such entertainment be dispersed
throughout the city." Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. The Twenty-first Amendment states in pertinent part: "The transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use
therein or intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S.
CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. The Court has held that the Twenty-first Amendment permits
states to proscribe nude entertainment in businesses selling alcohol. New York Liquor Au-
thority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981) (per curiam).
186. Barnes, Ill S. Ct. at 2465.
187. Id. at 2475.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 2465.
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those same 60,000 people would, however, be allowed to drive home and
then run about disrobed in the privacy of their own homes in front of an
audience if they so chose. 190 If nudity really was immoral, as Scalia sug-
gested, one would presume that the state would ban nudity everywhere. But
Indiana did not do so.
Indiana's failure to enact a truly general proscription required the Court
to examine the law with greater scrutiny. White felt that the purpose behind
a truly general nudity law was to prevent offense to others,' 9 1 and the pur-
pose behind the law as enforced against nude dancing was to prevent the
conveyance of perceived harmful erotic messages. 192 According to White,
Indiana wanted to prohibit nude dancing precisely because of the erotic
message that nude dancing expressed. Thus, the statute's direct purpose was
to restrict expression, and for this reason, White would have held the statute
unconstitutional.
III. CONCLUSION
Given the fact that Barnes was only a plurality decision and that no opin-
ion elicited majority support, it nevertheless appears that a majority will
agree on at least two points in the future: first, that nude barroom dancing is
protected by the First Amendment; and second, that states, for all practical
purposes and in spite of any First Amendment protection given to nude
dancing, may proscribe nude dancing in adult entertainment establishments
in order to protect public health, safety, or welfare. Eight justices in Barnes
agreed that nude dancing in adult entertainment businesses was protected by
the First Amendment and that the O'Brien "substantial governmental inter-
est" balancing test applied to determine the exact level of First Amendment
protection. Nevertheless, the Court decided that the state's interest in up-
holding morality or preventing crime was substantial enough to overcome a
dancer's First Amendment right to express eroticism with nudity. Astonish-
ingly, the Court did not require Indiana to prove that these purposes were
actually accomplished by the nudity statute. Rather, it was sufficient for the
state to assume that proscribing nude dancing would protect moral values or
The purpose of Indiana's nudity law would be violated, I think, if 60,000 fully
consenting adults crowded into the Hoosierdome to display their genitals to one
another, even if there were not an offended innocent in the crowd. Our society
prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited, certain activities not because
they harm others but because they are considered, in the traditional phrase,
"contra bonos mores," i.e., immoral.
Id.
190. Id. at 2475-76.
No one can doubt, however, that those same 60,000 Hoosiers would be perfectly
free to drive to their respective homes all across Indiana and, once there, to
parade around, cavort, and revel in the nude for hours in front of relatives and
friends. It is difficult to see why the State's interest in morality is any less in that
situation, especially if, as Justice Scalia seems to suggest, nudity is inherently
evil, but clearly the statute does not reach such activity.
Id.
191. Id. at 2473.
192. Id. at 2475.
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prevent crime. The Court merely required that Indiana present a rational
basis-at least rational to a conservative Court-for its regulation of admit-
tedly expressive conduct. In the mind of the Court, protection of morality
and prevention of crime were valid rational bases that could justify restric-
tions on nude dancing.
Although the Court asserted that nude dancing was protected by the First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of expression, given the result, it would
seem that this assertion really was unnecessary. The Court decided that
these constitutional concerns could be easily overridden. The Court's analy-
sis left states with a very low threshold to cross to justify a proscription on
nude dancing. For the Court, simple majoritarian morality was sufficient
justification to proscribe an activity admittedly protected by the First
Amendment.
Considering the emphasis placed on identifying the substantial govern-
mental interest behind the Indiana law, it is surprising that the Court ig-
nored entirely the language of the 1881 public indecency statute, 193 which
the current law replaced. The 1881 law supported the dissent's argument
that the purpose behind the law in general was to prevent offense to others,
proscribing "indecent exposure ... where there are other persons to be of-
fended or annoyed thereby."' 194 Given that Indiana's legislature and courts
had never officially commented on the purpose of the current public inde-
cency law, one would assume that the next most logical place to look for the
state's purpose would be the text of past statutes. Instead, the Court chose
to disregard this obvious choice, while it looked to more equivocal grounds
to justify the law.
Practically, the Court's decision gives states free reign in proscribing nude
dancing in adult bookstores, theaters, and nightclubs. Any proscription will
be constitutional so long as the state makes the simple assertion that its in-
tent is to uphold morality or avert other deleterious secondary effects sup-
posedly linked to nude "go-go" dancing. In other words, the Court may
claim to apply a "substantial governmental interests" test to determine
whether a law constitutionally prohibits adult nude dancing, but it appears
ready to uphold any such law regardless of the any balancing test. To the
Court, a simple statement in an appellate brief that a state is protecting
moral values or preventing crime is sufficient justification to bar nude
dancing.
It will be interesting to see whether the Court will regard the case nar-
rowly, for any extension of the Court's logic could result in broad restric-
tions on the freedom of speech. If protection of majoritarian morality is all
it takes to justify a proscription on nude dancing, how far could states move
to restrict other supposedly immoral activities on the same grounds? It
seems easy to construe Barnes to allow a state to censor all types of expres-
sive conduct merely because its legislature opines that an activity is
193. 1881 IND. REV. STAT. § 1995.




The decision certainly gives states a "new option to restrict totally nude
entertainment," 196 "a green light.., to aggressively enforce [sic] basic stan-
dards of decency," 197 and "a start in ... bringing some morality back into
the community."' 198 But it also "comes very close to saying that as long as
the state says its interest is in promoting morality rather than censoring
speech, it can censor speech as a way of promoting morality."199 One thing
is clear: the Court intends to allow the states the liberty to choose how far
they want to go in restricting a dancer's freedom of expression.
195. For an interesting commentary on the case see Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Bare Minimum
of Free Speech: The Nude Dancing Case Might Lead to a Narrowing of Protected Expression,
THE RECORDER, July 19, 1991, at 5.
It's possible that Barnes will go down as little more than a doctrinal tangent
reflecting a recognition that a nude woman flaunting her genitals to a crowd of
inebriated men waving dollar bills is very far indeed from the First Amend-
ment's core purposes.
But if its logic is extended, Barnes could prove to have broad implications, for
majoritarian morality has not previously been held to be a sufficiently compel-
ling state interest to justify restrictions of speech. A great deal of expressive
conduct with a weightier claim to First Amendment protection than nude danc-
ing can also give offense to majoritarian morality and might be threatened if the
court were to balance the value of particular expression against state interests in
order and morality.
One can imagine such logic being used to penalize, say, raucous political
protestors like the one who entered a courthouse wearing a jacket emblazoned
with "Fuck the Draft," which the court held to be protected speech in Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). After Barnes-and with dissenting Thurgood
Marshall now gone, as well as William Brennan, Jr. (whose vote would have
tipped the Barnes case the other way)-it's not hard to imagine the court over-
ruling the draft protestor's case.
For the matter, the court could revisit the celebrated flag-burning decisions of
1989 and 1990-both decided by 5-4 margins-which also involved expressive
conduct deeply offensive to the moral views of the majority.
It would take a longer leap from Rehnquists's logic in Barnes to reintroduce
censorship of pure speech that glorifies or advocates conduct that has been out-
lawed on moral grounds-for example, books that revel in adultery or other
illegal sexual activity, like the once-banned Lady Chatterly's Lover. A longer
leap, but-with much of constitutional law now seemingly up for grabs-not an
inconceivable one.
Id.
196. Ruth Marcus, High Court Upholds Ban on Nude Erotic Dancing; Free Speech Not
Violated, Justices Rule 5-4, WASHINGTON POST, June 22, 1991, at Al (quoting Indiana Dep-
uty Attorney General Wayne G. Uhl).
197. Id. (quoting Thomas Jipping of the Conservative Free Congress Foundation).
198. Id. (quoting Louann Hill, a member of a women's commission supporting the Indiana
law).
199. Id. (quoting Steven Shapiro of the American Civil Liberties Union).
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